Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects

dc.contributor.authorYengin, D.
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractWe study the problem of allocating objects when monetary transfers are possible. We are interested in mechanisms that allocate the objects in an efficient way and induce the agents to report their true preferences. Within the class of such mechanisms, first we characterize egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms. Then, we add a bounded-deficit condition and characterize the corresponding class. Finally, we investigate the relations between egalitarian-equivalence and other fairness notions such as no-envy.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityDuygu Yengin
dc.identifier.citationSocial Choice and Welfare, 2012; 38(1):137-160
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-010-0523-0
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.orcidYengin, D. [0000-0001-6848-111X]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/62761
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer-Verlag
dc.rights© Springer-Verlag 2010
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0523-0
dc.titleEgalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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