The impact of the number of sellers on quantal response equilibrium predictions in Bertrand oligopolies

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dc.contributor.authorBayer, R.C.
dc.contributor.authorDong, C.
dc.contributor.authorWu, H.
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies how increasing the number of sellers in a Bertrand oligopoly with homogenous goods affects the equilibrium price level predicted by logistic quantal response equilibrium (LQRE) and power‐function QRE (PQRE). We show that increasing the number of sellers reduces the average posted price in a PQRE, but can increase the average posted price in an LQRE. Our results indicate that the comparative‐static predictions of QRE (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995, Games Econ Behav, 10, 6–38) are not necessarily robust to changes of the quantal response function.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityRalph C Bayer, Chaohua Dong, Hang Wu
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2018; 28(4):787-793
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jems.12298
dc.identifier.issn1058-6407
dc.identifier.issn1530-9134
dc.identifier.orcidBayer, R.C. [0000-0001-8066-2685]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/123174
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.relation.granthttp://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP120101831
dc.rights© 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12298
dc.subjectBertrand Oligopoly; Comparative Statics; Quantal Response Equilibrium
dc.titleThe impact of the number of sellers on quantal response equilibrium predictions in Bertrand oligopolies
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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