Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorIwasaki, A.
dc.contributor.authorConitzer, V.
dc.contributor.authorOmori, Y.
dc.contributor.authorSakurai, Y.
dc.contributor.authorTodo, T.
dc.contributor.authorGuo, M.
dc.contributor.authorYokoo, M.
dc.contributor.conference9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (10 May 2010 - 14 May 2010 : Toronto, Canada)
dc.contributor.editorvan der Hoek, W.
dc.contributor.editorKaminka, G.
dc.contributor.editorLesperance, Y.
dc.contributor.editorLuck, M.
dc.contributor.editorSen, S.
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. Even the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not false-name-proof. It has previously been shown that there is no false-name-proof mechanism that always achieves a Pareto efficient allocation. Consequently, if false-name bids are possible, we need to sacrifice efficiency to some extent. This leaves the natural question of how much surplus must be sacrificed. To answer this question, this paper focuses on worst-case analysis. Specifically, we consider the fraction of the Pareto efficient surplus that we obtain and try to maximize this fraction in the worst-case, under the constraint of false-name-proofness. As far as we are aware, this is the first attempt to examine the worst-case efficiency of false-name-proof mechanisms. We show that the worst-case efficiency ratio of any false-name-proof mechanism that satisfies some apparently minor assumptions is at most 2/(m + 1) for auctions with m different goods. We also observe that the worst-case efficiency ratio of existing false-name-proof mechanisms is generally 1/m or 0. Finally, we propose a novel mechanism, called the adaptive reserve price mechanism that is false-name-proof when all bidders are single-minded. The worst-case efficiency ratio is 2/(m + 1), i.e., optimal.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityAtsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Mingyu Guo and Makoto Yokoo
dc.identifier.citationProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, 2010 / van der Hoek, W., Kaminka, G., Lesperance, Y., Luck, M., Sen, S. (ed./s), vol.2, pp.633-640
dc.identifier.isbn9780982657119
dc.identifier.issn1548-8403
dc.identifier.issn1558-2914
dc.identifier.orcidGuo, M. [0000-0002-3478-9201]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/87289
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
dc.publisher.placeUSA
dc.rights© 2010 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
dc.subjectMechanism design
dc.subjectCombinatorial auctions
dc.subjectWorst-case analysis
dc.subjectFalse-name-proofness
dc.titleWorst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
dc.typeConference paper
pubs.publication-statusPublished

Files

Collections

Computer Science publications