Right motive, wrong action: Direct consequentialism and evaluative conflict
Date
2006
Authors
Louise, J.
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Journal article
Citation
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2006; 9(1):65-85
Statement of Responsibility
Jennie Louise
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Abstract
In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as ‘evaluative conflict’) is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon must argue that causal relationship entails motives and acts (for example) having the same moral status. I argue that attempts to ensure such ‘evaluative consistency’ are themselves deeply problematic, and that we must therefore accept evaluative conflict.
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The original publication can be found at www.springerlink.com