As you were? Moral philosophy and the aetiology of moral experience

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dc.contributor.authorCullity, G.
dc.date.issued2006
dc.description© Routledge
dc.description.abstractWhat is the significance of empirical work on moral judgement for moral philosophy? Although the more radical conclusions that some writers have attempted to draw from this work are overstated, few areas of moral philosophy can remain unaffected by it. The most important question it raises is in moral epistemology. Given the explanation of our moral experience, how far can we trust it? Responding to this, the view defended here emphasizes the interrelatedness of moral psychology and moral epistemology. On this view, the empirical study of moral judgement does have important implications for moral philosophy. But moral philosophy also has important implications for the empirical study of moral judgement.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityGarrett Cullity
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophical Explorations: an international journal for the philosophy of mind and action, 2006; 9(7):117-131
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/13869790500492730
dc.identifier.issn1386-9795
dc.identifier.issn1741-5918
dc.identifier.orcidCullity, G. [0000-0003-4847-4304]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/36099
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherRoutledge
dc.source.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869790500492730
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Mind
dc.titleAs you were? Moral philosophy and the aetiology of moral experience
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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