A case for bundling public goods contributions

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dc.contributor.authorGhosh, S.
dc.contributor.authorKaraivanov, A.
dc.contributor.authorOak, M.
dc.date.issued2007
dc.description.abstractWe extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis-`a-vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilitySuman Ghosh, Alexander Karaivanov and Mandar Oak.
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Public Economic Theory, 2007; 9(3):425-450
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00313.x
dc.identifier.issn1097-3923
dc.identifier.issn1467-9779
dc.identifier.orcidOak, M. [0000-0002-7018-8737]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/58220
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing Inc
dc.rightsCopyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00313.x
dc.titleA case for bundling public goods contributions
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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