Levels and explanations

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dc.contributor.authorOpie, J.
dc.contributor.conferenceConference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (9th : 2009 : Sydney, Australia)
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractIt is a mainstay of the philosophy of science that reduction is a relationship between theories pitched at different levels of nature. But the relevant sense of “level” is notoriously difficult to pin down. A promising recent analysis links the notion of level to the compositional relations associated with mechanistic explanation. Such relations do not order objects by scale or physical type; one and the same kind of entity can occur at several levels in a single mechanism. I will sketch this approach to levels and consider some of its implications for our understanding of the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityJon Opie
dc.identifier.citationProceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (ASCS09), held in Sydney New South Wales Sept 30- Oct 2 2009, 2010 / W. Christensen, E. Schier and J. Sutton (eds.): pp.270-276
dc.identifier.doi10.5096/ascs200941
dc.identifier.isbn9780646529189
dc.identifier.orcidOpie, J. [0000-0001-6593-4750]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/64411
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherAustralian Society for Cognitive Science
dc.publisher.placeSydney
dc.rightsCopyright 2009 by the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science
dc.source.urihttp://www.maccs.mq.edu.au/news/conferences/2009/ASCS2009/
dc.subjectreduction
dc.subjectexplanation
dc.subjectlevels of nature
dc.subjectmechanism
dc.subjectmechanistic explanation
dc.titleLevels and explanations
dc.typeConference paper
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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