Defending the semantic conception of computation in cognitive science

dc.contributor.authorO'Brien, G.
dc.date.issued2011
dc.description.abstractCognitive science is founded on the conjecture that natural intelligence can be explained in terms of computation. Yet, notoriously, there is no consensus among philosophers of cognitive science as to how computation should be characterised. While there are subtle differences between the various accounts of computation found in the literature, the largest fracture exists between those that unpack computation in semantic terms (and hence view computation as the processing of representations) and those, such as that defended by Chalmers (2011), that cleave towards a purely syntactic formulation (and hence view computation in terms of abstract functional organisation). It will be the main contention of this paper that this dispute arises because contemporary computer science is an amalgam of two different historical traditions, each of which has developed its own proprietary conception of computation. Once these historical trajectories have been properly delineated, and the motivations behind the associated conceptions of computation revealed, it becomes a little clearer which should form the foundation for cognitive science.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityGerard O’Brien
dc.description.urihttp://j-cs.org/issues/__vol012i4/3.html
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Cognitive Science, 2011; 12:381-399
dc.identifier.issn1598-2327
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/75543
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInternational Association for Cognitive Science
dc.rights©2011 Institute for Cognitive Science, Seoul National University
dc.source.urihttp://j-cs.org/gnuboard/bbs/board.php?bo_table=__vol012i4&wr_id=3
dc.subjectcognition
dc.subjectcomputation
dc.subjectrepresentation
dc.subjectcognitive science
dc.subjectcomputer science
dc.titleDefending the semantic conception of computation in cognitive science
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

Files