Cachebleed: a timing attack on OpenSSL constant time RSA
Files
(Restricted Access)
Date
2016
Authors
Yarom, Y.
Genkin, D.
Heninger, N.
Editors
Gierlichs, B.
Poschmann, A.
Poschmann, A.
Advisors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Type:
Conference paper
Citation
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 2016 / Gierlichs, B., Poschmann, A. (ed./s), vol.9813 LNCS, pp.346-367
Statement of Responsibility
Yuval Yarom, Daniel Genkin, and Nadia Heninger
Conference Name
18th International Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES) (17 Aug 2016 - 19 Aug 2016 : Santa Barbara, CA)
Abstract
The scatter-gather technique is a commonly implemented approach to prevent cache-based timing attacks. In this paper we show that scatter-gather is not constant time. We implement a cache timing attack against the scatter-gather implementation used in the modular exponentiation routine in OpenSSL version 1.0.2f. Our attack exploits cache-bank conflicts on the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture. We have tested the attack on an Intel Xeon E5-2430 processor. For 4096-bit RSA our attack can fully recover the private key after observing 16,000 decryptions.
School/Discipline
Dissertation Note
Provenance
Description
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9813
Access Status
Rights
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016