Who are law's persons? from cheshire cats to responsible subjects

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dc.contributor.authorNaffine, N.
dc.date.issued2003
dc.descriptionThe definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
dc.description.abstractWhat is it to be a legal person? A review of the jurisprudence of persons reveals considerable confusion about this central legal question, as well as deep intellectual divisions. To certain jurists, law's person should and does approximate a metaphysical person. Depending on the metaphysics of the jurist, the legal person is thus variously defined by his uniquely human nature, by his possession of a soul, or by his capacity for reason, and therefore his moral and legal responsibility. To other jurists, law's person is not a metaphysical person but rather a pure legal abstraction; he is no more than a formal, abstract, but nonetheless highly convenient device of law. This paper endeavours to bring some order and clarity to these scholarly debates about the nature of legal personality. It also considers their implications for feminist legal theorists, with their enduring interest in the character of law's subject.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityNgaire Naffine
dc.identifier.citationThe Modern Law Review, 2003; 66(3):346-367
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1468-2230.6603002
dc.identifier.issn0026-7961
dc.identifier.issn1468-2230
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/2626
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishers Ltd
dc.source.urihttp://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-2230.6603002
dc.titleWho are law's persons? from cheshire cats to responsible subjects
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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