Beyond the fringe

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorOpie, J.
dc.date.issued2004
dc.description© MIT Press
dc.description.abstractMangan makes a useful contribution to our understanding of the structure and function of the nonsensory fringe of consciousness. I offer a few friendly amendments and criticisms. In particular, I argue that the fringe/focus structure of experience is considerably more complex than Mangan allows, and that his account of the function of fringe experience doesn’t do justice to the emergent nature of the cognitive subject.
dc.identifier.citationPsyche, 2004; 10(1):www 1-www 7
dc.identifier.issn1039-723X
dc.identifier.orcidOpie, J. [0000-0001-6593-4750]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/16162
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherMIT Press
dc.source.urihttp://www.theassc.org/files/assc/2593.pdf
dc.subjectConsciousness
dc.subjectnon-sensory fringe
dc.subjectattention
dc.subjectcognitive subject
dc.titleBeyond the fringe
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

Files

Collections

Philosophy publications