Cooperation in partnerships: the role of breakups and reputation
Files
(Restricted Access)
Date
2016
Authors
Bayer, R.
Editors
Advisors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Type:
Journal article
Citation
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2016; 172(4):615-638
Statement of Responsibility
Ralph-C. Bayer
Conference Name
Abstract
We investigate experimentally if endogenous partnership formation improves efficiency in social dilemmas. Subjects play multiple two-player public-goods games, where they can break up with their partner periodically. A stable-marriage mechanism based on rankings provided by singles determines the new matches. We vary the information subjects have on possible matches and whether staying in a partnership leads to a cost or a bonus. We find that endogenous group formation can increase efficiency. Both the provision of contribution history and bonuses have positive effects. At least one of these factors is required for efficiency improvements. The presence of both leads to the best results. (JEL: D03, D83, H41)
School/Discipline
Dissertation Note
Provenance
Description
Access Status
Rights
© 2016 Mohr Siebeck