Narrow Structuralism: Paving a Middle Path Between Cummins and Millikan

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2017

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Nestor, M.

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Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017; 95(1):109-123

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Matthew J. Nestor

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Millikan [2000] has levelled a number of persuasive criticisms against Cummins's [1996] theory of mental representation. In this paper, I pave a middle path in the debate between Cummins [2000] and Millikan [2000] to answer two questions. (1) How are representations applied to targets? (2) How is the content of a representation determined? The result is a new theory of mental representation, which I call narrow structuralism.

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© 2016 Australasian Association of Philosophy

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