Determinants of CEO compensation: generalist - specialist versus insider - outsider attributes

dc.contributor.authorBrockman, P.
dc.contributor.authorLee, H.
dc.contributor.authorSalas, J.
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractWe examine the distinct effects of generalist–specialist versus insider–outsider attributes on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation patterns. Our cross-sectional results show that each attribute has a significant impact on both the level and structure of CEO compensation. CEOs with a high generalist–outsider combination receive the highest total compensation, followed by generalist–insiders, specialist–outsiders, and finally specialist–insiders. Our time-series results show that the generalist–specialist effect remains constant through time while the insider–outsider effect diminishes over time. These findings suggest that the generalist premium is the result of a fundamental shift in the need for generalist skills to manage increasingly-complex enterprises. In contrast, the outsider premium is more likely caused by a temporary increase in bargaining power during contract negotiations. Overall, our study disentangles generalist–specialist attributes from insider–outsider attributes and then identifies the specific channels through which each attribute affects executive compensation.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityPaul Brockman, Hye Seung (Grace) Lee, Jesus M.Salas
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Corporate Finance, 2016; 39:53-77
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.04.007
dc.identifier.issn0929-1199
dc.identifier.issn1872-6313
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/116597
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rights© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.04.007
dc.subjectExecutive compensation; CEO insiderness; generalist skills
dc.titleDeterminants of CEO compensation: generalist - specialist versus insider - outsider attributes
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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