A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware

Date

2018

Authors

Ge, Q.
Yarom, Y.
Cock, D.
Heiser, G.

Editors

Advisors

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Type:

Journal article

Citation

Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 2018; 8(1):1-27

Statement of Responsibility

Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock, Gernot Heiser

Conference Name

DOI

10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6

Abstract

Microarchitectural timing channels expose hidden hardware states though timing. We survey recent attacks that exploit microarchitectural features in shared hardware, especially as they are relevant for cloud computing. We classify types of attacks according to a taxonomy of the shared resources leveraged for such attacks. Moreover, we take a detailed look at attacks used against shared caches. We survey existing countermeasures. We finally discuss trends in attacks, challenges to combating them, and future directions, especially with respect to hardware support.

School/Discipline

Dissertation Note

Provenance

Description

Published online: 26 December 2016

Access Status

Rights

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

License

Grant ID

ARC

Published Version

https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-016-0141-6

Call number

Persistent link to this record

http://hdl.handle.net/2440/106687