The Contents of Imagination
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(Published version)
Date
2023
Authors
Fernandez, J.
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Journal article
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2023; 52(8):828-842
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Jordi Fernández
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Abstract
Our imaginings seem to be similar to our perceiving and remembering episodes in that they all represent something. They all seem to have content. But what exactly is the structure and the source of the content of our imaginings? In this paper, I put forward an account of imaginative content. The main tenet of this account is that, when a subject tries to imagine a state of affairs by having some experience, their imagining has a counterfactual content. What the subject imagines is that perceiving the state of affairs would be, for them, like having that experience. I discuss three alternative views of imaginative content, and argue that none of them can account for two types of error in imagination. The proposed view, I suggest, can account for both types of error while, at the same time, preserving some intuitions which seem to motivate the alternative views.
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Published 28 July 2023
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© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.