A game-theoretic approach to modelling crop royalties.
| dc.contributor.advisor | Bayer, Ralph-Christopher | en |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Binenbaum, Eran | en |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Anderson, Kym | en |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wong, Jacob | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Arnold, Anne Jillian | en |
| dc.contributor.school | School of Economics | en |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Plant variety rights assist crop breeders to appropriate returns from new varieties and incentivise varietal improvement. Royalties are one form of plant variety rights and this dissertation asks which combination of the available royalty instruments is best from the perspective of consumers, farmers, crop breeders, and the overall economy. We use a game-theoretic approach to model strategic interactions between breeders and farmers. The model allows farmer privilege, whereby farmers save seed one year to plant in the future, and we show a point-of- sale royalty with either or both of the remaining royalties is optimal, whether or not we allow the possibility of farmers under-paying royalties through under-declaring output or saved seed. We also develop a Principal–Agent model, in which risk-neutral breeders share the risk with risk-averse farmers. In this model, the optimum royalty depends on various parameters, including the costs of compliance and enforcement. | en |
| dc.description.dissertation | Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2015 | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2440/95230 | |
| dc.provenance | This electronic version is made publicly available by the University of Adelaide in accordance with its open access policy for student theses. Copyright in this thesis remains with the author. This thesis may incorporate third party material which has been used by the author pursuant to Fair Dealing exceptions. If you are the owner of any included third party copyright material you wish to be removed from this electronic version, please complete the take down form located at: http://www.adelaide.edu.au/legals | en |
| dc.subject | game-theory; economic model; end-point royalty; point-of-sale royalty; saved seed; farmer privilege; principal–agent model | en |
| dc.title | A game-theoretic approach to modelling crop royalties. | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |
Files
Original bundle
1 - 3 of 3
No Thumbnail Available
- Name:
- Restricted
- Size:
- 1.08 MB
- Format:
- Adobe Portable Document Format
- Description:
- Library staff access only