Resisting ruthless reductionism: A comment on Bickle

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dc.contributor.authorBayne, T.
dc.contributor.authorFernandez, J.
dc.date.issued2005
dc.descriptionThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
dc.description.abstractPhilosophy and Neuroscienceis an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in the philosophy of mind. Although we have learnt much from Bickle's work, we find his central claims unconvincing. Our comments have two central foci:Bickle's account of mental causation, and his single-cell account of consciousness. We argue that Bickle's attempt to solve the problem of mental causation is marred by his refusal to take multiple realizability seriously, and we suggest that his faith in single cell accounts of consciousness is misplaced. We remain unconvinced that the solutions to the problems of mental causation and consciousness are to be found in neuroscience.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityTim Bayne and Jordi Fernandez
dc.identifier.citationPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2005; 4(3):239-248
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11097-005-4073-3
dc.identifier.issn1568-7759
dc.identifier.issn1572-8676
dc.identifier.orcidFernandez, J. [0000-0002-4502-1003]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/38117
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlands
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4073-3
dc.subjectPsycho-physical identity
dc.subjectmental causation
dc.subjectconsciousness
dc.subjectexternalism
dc.subjectinternalism
dc.titleResisting ruthless reductionism: A comment on Bickle
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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