Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context

dc.contributor.author	García Lapresta, J.L.
dc.contributor.author	Marley, A.A.J.
dc.contributor.author	Martínez Panero, M.
dc.date.issued	2010
dc.description.abstract	An increasing body of theoretical and empirical work on discrete choice considers a choice design in which a person is asked to select both the best and the worst alternative in an available set of alternatives, in contrast to more traditional tasks, such as where the person is asked to: select the best alternative; select the worst alternative; rank the alternatives. Here we consider voting systems motivated by such "best-worst" choice; characterize a class of "best-worst" voting systems in terms of a set of axioms in the context of scoring rules; and discuss briefly possible extensions to approval-disapproval systems.
dc.identifier.citation	Social Choice and Welfare, 2010; 34(3):487-496
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s00355-009-0417-1
dc.identifier.issn	0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn	1432-217X
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1959.8/155480
dc.language.iso	en
dc.publisher	Springer
dc.relation.funding	ARC DP034343632
dc.relation.funding	Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada 8124
dc.rights	Copyright 2009 Springer-Verlag
dc.source.uri	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0417-1
dc.title	Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
dc.type	Journal article
pubs.publication-status	Published
ror.mmsid	9915910474501831

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