Base-rates, fast and slow: Testing single-process and dual-process models of reasoning
Date
2022
Authors
Sikora Przibilla, Alexander
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Abstract
Dual-process theories of cognition hold that human reasoning is driven by two distinct forms of processing; Type 1 processing which is fast, intuitive, and based on heuristics, and Type 2 processing which is slow, rule based, and requires working memory. Dual-process theories have been used to explain people's tendency to neglect or underweight important base-rate information, relying instead on heuristics-based stereotype information to guide reasoning judgements. However, recent research employing formal model-testing approaches has begun to challenge these theories, finding that a single-process account can also explain a wide range of reasoning data. Such model-testing approaches have yet to be applied to classic base-rate reasoning tasks. The current study employed signed difference analysis (SDA) to test competing dual- and single-process theories, instantiating them as signal detection models and examining their predictions for human performance in a base-rate reasoning task. In an online experiment, 120 participants completed a base-rate task that varied in a number of factors relevant to dual- process assumptions, including time pressure. Results indicated that manipulations of time pressure and base-rate discrepancy affected participants' sensitivity to base-rate information. These effects were consistent with a dual-process account, however the results from SDA indicated that a single-process model could not be ruled out in favour of a dual-process model. This finding shows that single-process theories may provide a viable account of how people reason with base-rate information, further challenging the widespread acceptance and application of dual-process theories.
School/Discipline
School of Psychology
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Thesis (B.PsychSc(Hons)) -- University of Adelaide, School of Psychology, 2022
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