Partial ownership and cross-border mergers

dc.contributor.author	Stähler, F.
dc.date.issued	2014
dc.description.abstract	Partial ownership can be used as a screening device by a foreign firm which wants to merge with a local firm whose productivity is private information. As partial ownership is confined to sharing future merger profits, it cannot achieve complete separation in all cases but improves expected merger gains also in an equilibrium which is not fully separating. Without partial ownership, the foreign firm potentially discriminates against high productivities. In a pooling equilibrium with partial ownership, however, it will potentially discriminate against intermediate productivities.
dc.description.statementofresponsibility	Frank Stähler
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Economics, 2014; 111(3):209-237
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s00712-012-0327-z
dc.identifier.issn	0931-8658
dc.identifier.issn	1617-7134
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2440/108974
dc.language.iso	en
dc.publisher	Springer
dc.rights	© Springer-Verlag Wien 2012
dc.source.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0327-z
dc.subject	Partial ownership; merger; multinational firms; foreign direct investment; asymmetric information
dc.title	Partial ownership and cross-border mergers
dc.type	Journal article
pubs.publication-status	Published

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