Public interest and regulatory capture in the Swedish electricity market
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2009
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Smyth, R.
Söderberg, M.
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This paper tests the public interest and regulatory capture hypotheses, in the context of the Swedish electricity market, by studying the factors influencing the Swedish Energy Agency‟s decision to remove decision-makers it employs to hear customer complaints against utilities. The study covers the period from the beginning of 1996, when a series of regulatory reforms were introduced to improve consumer protection, until the end of 2007. The study concludes that decision-makers who find in favour of customers have a statistically lower probability of being removed. There is, however, weak evidence in one of the empirical specifications that the length of time between when the regulatory reform was introduced and when the decision was made significantly increases the probability of removal of decision-makers finding in favour of customers, consistent with the life-cycle theory. The study also concludes that finding for customers when the complaint is filed against privately-owned utilities or state-owned utilities has a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of removal.
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Copyright [2009] Russell Smyth and Magnus Söderberg. Not for distribution without permission of author(s).