Sectoral influence on competition legislation: evidence from the Cartel Registers, 1920-2000

dc.contributor.author	Fellman, S.
dc.contributor.author	Shanahan, M.
dc.date.issued	2018
dc.description.abstract	Legislation that required the registration of firms' anticompetitive agreements (cartel registers) to reveal, and sometimes regulate, anticompetitive behavior was relatively common in many nations before 1975. Examining the introduction of these registers in sixteen mostly OECD countries between 1920 and 2000 reveals which industries and sectors appeared to minimize successfully the impact of the legislation in their jurisdiction. We find considerable variation, but in most countries, the agriculture and export sectors were especially successful in avoiding or delaying the application of a register in their areas of interest.
dc.identifier.citation	Business History Review, 2018; 92(4):633-660
dc.identifier.doi	10.1017/S0007680518001058
dc.identifier.issn	0007-6805
dc.identifier.issn	2044-768X
dc.identifier.orcid	Shanahan, M. [0000-0002-0405-2989]
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/11541.2/135936
dc.language.iso	en
dc.publisher	Cambridge University Press
dc.rights	Copyright 2019 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
dc.source.uri	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680518001058
dc.subject	business regulation
dc.subject	anticompetitive behavior
dc.subject	policy influence
dc.subject	cartel register
dc.title	Sectoral influence on competition legislation: evidence from the Cartel Registers, 1920-2000
dc.type	Journal article
pubs.publication-status	Published
ror.mmsid	9916260907701831

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