Kant-Nash equilibrium in a quantity-setting oligopoly

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Date

2016

Authors

Long, N.

Editors

von Mouche, P.
Quartieri, F.

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Book chapter

Citation

Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games: Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi, 2016 / von Mouche, P., Quartieri, F. (ed./s), Ch.12, pp.179-201

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Ngo Van Long

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DOI

10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_12

Abstract

This paper studies oligopolistic equilibria when not all firms behave in a Nashian fashion. The Kantian firms act according to norms of behavior that reflect the Kantian categorical imperative. We introduce the concepts of Exclusive Kant- Nash Equilibrium and Inclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium to study such situations. Our model formalises Sen’s conjecture that in actual situations people often do not follow the selfish strategy because of the Kantian norm of behavior.

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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

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http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319292533

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http://hdl.handle.net/2440/109419