Kant-Nash equilibrium in a quantity-setting oligopoly

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dc.contributor.authorLong, N.
dc.contributor.editorvon Mouche, P.
dc.contributor.editorQuartieri, F.
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies oligopolistic equilibria when not all firms behave in a Nashian fashion. The Kantian firms act according to norms of behavior that reflect the Kantian categorical imperative. We introduce the concepts of Exclusive Kant- Nash Equilibrium and Inclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium to study such situations. Our model formalises Sen’s conjecture that in actual situations people often do not follow the selfish strategy because of the Kantian norm of behavior.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityNgo Van Long
dc.identifier.citationEquilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games: Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi, 2016 / von Mouche, P., Quartieri, F. (ed./s), Ch.12, pp.179-201
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_12
dc.identifier.isbn3319292536
dc.identifier.isbn9783319292533
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/109419
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer International Publishing
dc.publisher.placeSwitzerland
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSpringer Series in Game Theory
dc.rights© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
dc.source.urihttp://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319292533
dc.titleKant-Nash equilibrium in a quantity-setting oligopoly
dc.typeBook chapter
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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