Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices

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dc.contributor.authorBose, S.
dc.contributor.authorRenou, L.
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity-sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. Deliberate engineering of ambiguity, through ambiguous mediated communication, can allow (partial) implementation of social choice functions that are not incentive compatible with respect to prior beliefs. We provide a complete characterization of social choice functions partially implementable by ambiguous mechanisms.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilitySubir Bose, Ludovic Renou
dc.identifier.citationEconometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 2014; 82(5):1853-1872
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/ECTA10285
dc.identifier.issn0012-9682
dc.identifier.issn1468-0262
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/109478
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.rights© 2014 The Econometric Society
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10285
dc.subjectMechanism design; ambiguity; communication device; multiple priors
dc.titleMechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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