Delusion and self-deception
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(Embargo ends May 2026)
Date
2024
Authors
Fernandez, J.
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Sullivan-Bissett, E.
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Book chapter
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The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion, 2024 / Sullivan-Bissett, E. (ed./s), Ch.22, pp.336-346
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Jordi Fernández
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Abstract
This chapter explores the similarities and the differences between delusion and self-deception. Delusion and self-deception are similar in some ways. For that reason, it is tempting to consider the possibility that we might be able to subsume one of the two conditions under the other one. In other words, it is tempting to consider whether delusions might be a type of self-deception or whether, conversely, being self-deceived might simply be a way of being deluded. In this chapter, I will argue that this temptation should be resisted. First, I offer a rough characterisation of both delusion and self-deception. Then, I highlight the respect in which the two conditions are alike: Both conditions seem to involve beliefs which appear to be unresponsive to evidence. Next, I discuss several respects in which the two conditions are different: Firstly, they have different aetiologies. Also, their social impact and their impact on the subject’s well-being are different. The normative aspects of self-deception and delusion are different as well. And, finally, they have different connections to psychopathology, and to the notion of mental illness. For all these reasons, I conclude, delusion and self-deception should be pulled apart as two separate conditions.
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© 2024 Taylor & Francis