Decision-Making on the Full Information Secretary Problem

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Date

2005

Authors

Lee, M.
Gregory, T.
Welsh, M.

Editors

Forbus, K.
Gentner, D.
Regier, T.

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Conference paper

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Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Conference of the Cognitive Science Society / K. Forbus, D. Gentner, T. Reiger (eds.), pp. 819-824

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Michael D. Lee, Tess A. O'Connor and Matthew B. Welsh

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Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (26th : 2004 : Chicago, Ill.)

Abstract

The secretary problem is a recreational mathematics problem, suited to laboratory experimentation, that nevertheless is representative of a class of real world sequential decision-making tasks. In the ‘full information’ version, an observer is presented with a sequence of values from a known distribution, and is required to choose the maximum value. The difficulties are that a value can only be chosen at the time it is presented, that the last value in the sequence is a forced choice if none is chosen earlier, and that any value that is not the maximum is scored as completely wrong. We report a study of human performance on full information secretary problems with 10, 20 and 50 values in the sequence, and considers three different heuristics as models of human decision-making. It is found that some people achieve near-optimal levels of accuracy, but that there are individual differences in human performance. A quantitative evaluation of the three heuristics, using the Minimum Description Length criterion, shows inter-individual differences, but intra-individual consistency, in the use of the heuristics. In particular, people seem to use the heuristics that involve choosing a value when it exceeds an internal threshold, but differ in how they set thresholds. On the basis of these findings, a more general threshold-based family of heuristic models is developed.

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© the authors

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