Pulling together by paying together: The effect of product market competition on TMT incentive dispersion
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Date
2023
Authors
Jaroenjitrkam, A.
Mihaylov, G.
Yu, C.
Zurbruegg, R.
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Journal of Business Research, 2023; 165:114045-1-114045-12
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Anutchanat Jaroenjitrkam, George Mihaylov, Chia-Feng, Jeffrey, Yu, Ralf Zurbruegg
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Abstract
We examine whether firms that face increased competition are more likely to seek uniformity in the incentive payments made to top management teams (TMTs). Motivated by social comparison theory, we conjecture that variation in executive incentive payments will reduce as a strategic response to encourage TMT cooperation. We test this hypothesis by examining how TMT incentive dispersion changes following exogenous product market competition shocks from reduced tariff cuts. Matched difference-in-differences regressions on a large sample of manufacturing firms between 1992 and 2019 support our prediction. Firms experiencing large tariff cuts are associated with both lower total- and equity-incentive dispersion. This effect is stronger for firms with more powerful CEOs, suggesting that CEOs are a key channel for implementing the strategic use of TMT incentives in firms facing external competition.
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© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).