Pride and prejudice: a case for reform of judicial recusal procedure

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RA_hdl_109549.pdf (1.98 MB)
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2017

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Appleby, G.
McDonald, S.

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Journal article

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Legal Ethics, 2017; 20(1):89-114

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Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonaldc

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Abstract

Justice must both be done and be seen to be done. A legal principle designed to give effect to this fundamental proposition is that a judge must not sit to determine a dispute if he or she is biased, or if there exists a reasonable perception that he or she is biased. Across many common law jurisdictions – including the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and many jurisdictions in the United States – the judge in question himself or herself is required to undertake the assessment of whether bias, or an apprehension of bias, exists. Drawing on insights from behavioural psychology and a series of case studies from across these jurisdictions, this paper offers an extended analysis of this practice and identifies and evaluates alternative proposals.

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Published Online: 7 December 2016

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© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

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