Pride and prejudice: a case for reform of judicial recusal procedure
| dc.contributor.author | Appleby, G. | |
| dc.contributor.author | McDonald, S. | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.description | Published Online: 7 December 2016 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Justice must both be done and be seen to be done. A legal principle designed to give effect to this fundamental proposition is that a judge must not sit to determine a dispute if he or she is biased, or if there exists a reasonable perception that he or she is biased. Across many common law jurisdictions – including the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and many jurisdictions in the United States – the judge in question himself or herself is required to undertake the assessment of whether bias, or an apprehension of bias, exists. Drawing on insights from behavioural psychology and a series of case studies from across these jurisdictions, this paper offers an extended analysis of this practice and identifies and evaluates alternative proposals. | |
| dc.description.statementofresponsibility | Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonaldc | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Legal Ethics, 2017; 20(1):89-114 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/1460728x.2017.1261521 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1460-728X | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1757-8450 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2440/109549 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | |
| dc.rights | © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group | |
| dc.source.uri | https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2017.1261521 | |
| dc.subject | Judicial ethics; recusal; bias | |
| dc.title | Pride and prejudice: a case for reform of judicial recusal procedure | |
| dc.type | Journal article | |
| pubs.publication-status | Published |
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