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Item Metadata only Fixed Point Theorems for Inconsistent and Incomplete Formation of Large Categories(Centre National Belge de Recherche de Logique, 1992) Mortensen, C.E.; School of Humanities : PhilosophyBrady's fixed point result for the nontriviality of inconsistent naive set theory is recast in a categorial setting.Item Open Access International aid and the scope of kindness(University of Chicago Press, 1994) Cullity, G.M.Item Metadata only Gillet: Representation, Meaning and Thought(Australasian Association for Philosophy, 1995) Gamble, Denise D.; School of Humanities : PhilosophyItem Metadata only McGinn: Problems in Philosophy, the Limits of Inquiry(Australasian Association for Philosophy, 1995) Nerlich, G.Item Metadata only Christiansen: Space-like Time(Australian Association for History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science, 1995) Nerlich, G.Item Metadata only Sheaf Spaces on Finite Closed sets(Centre Nationale Belge de Researches de Logique, 1995) James, W.Item Metadata only Aretaic cognitivism(University of Illinois Press, 1995) Cullity, G.M.Item Metadata only Munz: Philosophical Darwinism(Australian Association for Philosophy, 1995) Gamble, Denise D.; School of Humanities : PhilosophyItem Open Access Moral free riding(Wiley, 1995) Cullity, G.M.Item Open Access Moral character and the iteration problem(Cambridge University Press (CUP), 1995) Cullity, G.M.Moral evaluation is concerned with the attribution (to its various objects – actions, character, attitudes, states of affairs, institutions) of values whose distinction into two broad groups has become familiar. On the one hand, there are the most general moral values of lightness, wrongness, goodness, badness, and what ought to be or to be done. On the other, there is a great diversity of more specific moral values which these objects can have: of being a theft, for instance, or a thief; of honesty, reliability or callousness. Within the recent body of work attempting to restore to the virtues a central place in ethical thinking, two claims stand out. One is that, of these two kinds of values, the specific ones are explanatorily prior to the general – that if an action is wrong, it is because it is wrong in one of those specific respects. A second claim, though, is now standardly made definitive of ‘Virtue ethics’: that amongst the specific values, the value of character is explanatorily prior to that of action – that if an action is callous, say, it is because it expresses callousness of character – and that in this sense, the moral value of action derives from that of character. This second claim has been widely attacked; in what follows, I present a reason for believing that, at least in the case of callousness, it is right.Item Metadata only On the One hand: Reflections on Enantiomorphy(Australian Association for Philosophy, 1995) Nerlich, G.Item Metadata only Kant on Existence as a Property of Universals(1996) Djukic, D. G.Item Metadata only Goodman's Rejection of Resemblance(1996) Files, Craig M.Item Metadata only Review of S Hekeman, 'Moral Voices, Moral Selves'(1996) Chandler, J.Item Metadata only Mandatory retirement and justice(Philosophy Documentation Center, 1996) Chandler, J.Item Metadata only Item Metadata only Book Reivew of W. Martin Davies Experience and Content(1997) Popescu, Vladimir B.; School of Humanities : PhilosophyItem Metadata only Book Review of M. Baron, Kantian Ethics(1997) Gamble, Denise D.; School of Humanities : PhilosophyItem Metadata only Book Review of D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind(1997) O'Brien, G.Item Metadata only Practical theory(Clarendon Press, 1997) Cullity, G.M.; Cullity, G.M.; Gaut, B.