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Item Metadata only A Connectionist theory of phenomenal experience(CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 1999) O'Brien, G.; Opie, J.When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Consciousness is to be explained either in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys or in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, although there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research that purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind--the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. Two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies used in the dissociation studies--so critical, in fact, that it is no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this target article we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists of the explicit representation of information in neurally realized parallel distributed processing (PDP) networks. This hypothesis leads us to reassess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways.Item Metadata only A critique of Langsam's The 'Theory of Appearing Defended'(Kluwer Academic Publ, 2003) Djukic, D.; Popescu, V.Item Metadata only A Defense of Cartesian Materialism(PHILOSOPHY PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES, 1999) O'Brien, G.; Opie, J.Item Metadata only A metacognitive model of the sense of agency over thoughts(Informa UK Limited, 2012) Carruthers, G.; School of Humanities : PhilosophyIntroduction. The sense of agency over thoughts is the experience of oneself qua agent of mental action. Those suffering certain psychotic symptoms are thought to have a deficient sense of agency. Here I seek to explain this sense of agency in terms of metacognition. Method. I start with the proposal that the sense of agency is elicited by metacognitive monitoring representations that are used in the intentional inhibition of thoughts. I apply this model to verbal hallucinations and the like and examine the plausibility of this model explaining deficits associated with these symptoms. Results. By tying the sense of agency to metacognitive inhibition I propose that the loss of a sense of agency in certain psychotic symptoms is accompanied by a particular deficit in the patient's ability to control their own thinking. This is consistent with the experiences of those at high risk of developing hallucinations, who report more intrusive thoughts than controls. The model I present is able to explain why those at risk of developing verbal hallucinations and those suffering from verbal hallucinations have deficits in the intentional inhibition of thought. I defend this account from a possible objection by distinguishing the form of the intentional inhibition deficit displayed by those suffering verbal hallucination from that displayed by those suffering from orbital-frontal cortex lesions and posttraumatic stress disorder. Conclusion. A plausible hypothesis is that the sense of agency over thoughts is elicited by the metacognitive monitoring representation used to intentionally inhibit thoughts. The deficit in the sense of agency over thoughts associated with certain psychotic symptoms could be explained by a failure to properly metacognitively monitor certain thought processes.Item Metadata only A model of the synchronic self(Elsevier BV, 2007) Carruthers, G.; School of HumanitiesThe phenomenology of the self includes the sense of control over one’s body and mind, of being bounded in body and mind, of having perspective from within one’s body and mind and of being extended in time. I argue that this phenomenology is to be accounted for by a set of five dissociable cognitive capacities that compose the self. The focus of this paper is on the four capacities that compose the synchronic self: the agentiveB self, which underlies the sense of control over one’s body; the boundaryB self, which underlies the sense of being bounded within one’s body; the agentiveM self which underlies the sense of control over one’s thoughts; and the boundaryM self which underlies the sense of being bounded within one’s mind. I model the agentiveB and agentiveM selves as parts of the motor control system and the boundaryB self as the capacity to form and integrated map of the body. I point to the delusion of thought broadcast as a possible source of evidence for future research on the boundaryM self.Item Metadata only A neurocomputational model of delusion(Interdisciplinary Research Canada, 2006) Gerrans, P.; International ICSC Symposium. BICS 06 (2006 : Molyvos [Mithymna] Island of Lesvos, Greece); Manzotti, R.Delusions are currently characterised as false beliefs produced by incorrect inference about external reality (DSM IV, 1994). This inferential account has proved hard to link to explanations pitched at the level of neurobiology and neuroanatomy. This paper provides that link via a neurocomputational theory, based on evolutionary considerations, of the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in managing responses to experience. Neural network theory distinguishes between weight-based and activation based-processing. This distinction maps (roughly) to a distinction between modularised online cognition conducted by perceptual and sensory systems and offline cognition under the control of the PFC. The PFC regulates activation-based processing in transient neural networks constructed to deal with experiences produced as outputs of weight-based sensory and perceptual systems. The advantages of this implementation-level account are explored via a comparison with Shitij Kapur’s influential attempt to link dopamine dysregulation to the phenomenology of schizophrenia..Item Metadata only A one-stage explanation of the Cotard delusion(Journals Publishing Division, John Hopkins University Press, 2002) Gerrans, P.Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a two-stage explanation of the difference in content between the Capgras and Cotard delusions. That explanation treats them as alternative rationalizations of essentially the same phenomenology. I show, however, that once we distinguish the phenomenology (and the neuroetiology), a one-stage model is adequate. In the final section I make some more general remarks on the one- and two-stage models.Item Restricted A schizophrenic defense of a vehicle theory of consciousness(MIT Press, 2015) O'Brien, G.; Opie, J.; Gennaro, R.Item Metadata only A theory of virtue : excellence in being for the good(Oxford Univ Press, 2008) Cullity, G.Book Review: Adams, Robert Merrihew, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006, pp. xiiiþ249, £25 (cloth).Item Open Access A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence(Wiley, 2023) Gerrans, P.The initial cause of Cotard delusion is pervasive dyshomeostasis (dysregulation of basic bodily function). This explanation draws on interoceptive active inference account of self-representation. In this framework, the self is an hierarchical predictive model made by the brain to facilitate homeostatic regulation. The account I provide is an alternative to two factor accounts of the Cotard delusion that treat depersonalisation experience as the first factor in genesis of the Cotard delusion. I argue that depersonalisation experience and the Cotard delusion are produced by different breakdowns in the process of self-modelling.Item Restricted Acts, omissions, emissions(Cambridge University Press, 2015) Cullity, G.; Moss, J.Item Metadata only Adelaide, University of(Monash University Press, 2010) Mortensen, C.; Nerlich, G.Item Metadata only Aesthetic Autonomy and Praxis: art and language in Adorno and Habermas(Routledge, 2011) McMahon, J.Aesthetic autonomy has been given a variety of interpretations, which in many cases involve a number of claims. Key among them are: (i) art eludes conventional conceptual frameworks and their inherent incompatibility with invention and creativity; and (ii) art can communicate aspects of experience too fine-grained for discursive language. To accommodate such claims one can adopt either a convention-based account or a natural-kind account. A natural-kind theory can explain the first but requires some special scaffolding in order to support the second, while a convention-based account accommodates the second but is incompatible with the first. Theodor W. Adorno attempts to incorporate both claims within his aesthetic theory, but arguably in his aesthetic theory each is cancelled out by the other. Art's independence of entrenched conceptual frameworks needs to be made compatible with its communicative role. Jrgen Habermas, in contrast, provides a solution by way of his theory of language. I draw upon the art practice of the contemporary Icelandic-Danish artist Olafur Eliasson in order to demonstrate this.Item Metadata only Aesthetic autonomy: tracing the Kantian legacy to Olafur Eliasson(European Society for Aesthetics, 2011) McMahon, J.; European Society for Aesthetics Conference (2011 : Grenoble, France)Aesthetic autonomy is sometimes equated with an art for art’s sake approach to art. On the contrary, the philosophers whose work is often cited as backup to this concept of aesthetic autonomy held a very different conception of it. I will trace an alternative notion of aesthetic autonomy in the work of Adorno and Habermas, the origins of which can be found in Immanuel Kant’s aesthetic theory, the popular notion of his formalism, notwithstanding. I draw upon the art practice of the contemporary Icelandic-Danish artist Olafur Eliasson in order to demonstrate this alternative notion of aesthetic autonomy.Item Metadata only “Aesthetic Ideas”: mystery and meaning in the early work of Barrie Kosky(Springer, 2021) McMahon, J.; Severn, J.R.; Phillips, J.In this chapter I invite the reader to consider the philosophical assumptions which underpin the early career aims and objectives of Barrie Kosky. A focus will be his “language” of opera, and the processes by which the audience is prompted to interpret it. The result will be to see how Kosky creates mystery and meaning while avoiding fantasy and escapism; and can express psychological truth while stimulating subjective interpretations. The point will be to show that Kosky’s oeuvre demonstrates a central concept in the Kantian tradition of aesthetic theory regarding the key process in creative expression, and that is the evocation/communication of “aesthetic ideas”.Item Metadata only Aesthetic reflection and the very possibility of art(The Contemporary Art Centre of SA, 2007) McMahon, J.; Ian North,Item Metadata only Aesthetics and film. By Katherine Thomson-Jones(Blackwell Publ Ltd, 2012) McMahon, J.Item Metadata only Aesthetics and material beauty - Aesthetics naturalized(Routledge, 2007) McMahon, J.In Aesthetics and Material Beauty, Jennifer A. McMahon develops a new aesthetic theory she terms Critical Aesthetic Realism - taking Kantian aesthetics as a starting point and drawing upon contemporary theories of mind from philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The creative process does not proceed by a set of rules. Yet the fact that its objects can be understood or appreciated by others suggests that the creative process is constrained by principles to which others have access. According to her update of Kantian aesthetics, beauty is grounded in indeterminate yet systematic principles of perception and cognition. However, Kant's aesthetic theory rested on a notion of indeterminacy whose consequences for understanding the nature of art were implausible. McMahon conceptualizes "indeterminacy" in terms of contemporary philosophical, psychological, and computational theories of mind. In doing so, she develops an aesthetic theory that reconciles the apparent dichotomies which stem from the tension between the determinacy of communication and the indeterminacy of creativity. Dichotomies such as universality and subjectivity, objectivity and autonomy, cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and truth and beauty are revealed as complementary features of an aesthetic judgment.Item Metadata only Aesthetics and Rock Art.(Oxford Univ Press, 2006) McMahon, J.Book Review: Aesthetics and Rock Art. Edited by THOMAS HEYD and JOHN CLEGG. Ashgate. 2005. pp. xxv + 316. 106 b & w illustrations. £55.00 (hbk).Item Open Access Aesthetics is the grammar of desire(Dutch Association of Aesthetics, 2015) McMahon, J.A.This essay presents (i) the nature of aesthetic judgment, (ii) the significance of aesthetic judgment and finally, (iii) the relevance of art to understanding aesthetic judgment.